A foreign policy doctrine for India.

Hopes of emulating the success of an ‘Iraqi surge’ in Afghanistan may not have been fully realised. With the US stuck in a quagmire of economic crisis and a perception of loss of power, USA increasingly is looking for a way out. India should have been the traditional go to nation for sharing some of the burdens of the Afghan war, however with Pakistan objecting to even token Indian presence, this seems unlikely.

There is a fair amount of analysis on possible outcomes of USA withdrawal and role of India in such a post-USA Af-Pak world. One of the constants of such analysis has been the certainty of a de-facto Pakistan takeover of Afghanistan. With a return of Taliban and strengthened Pakistani elements, the 60 year old Indian endeavour of settling its western borders would be considerably weakened. A victorious Pakistan would be a recalcitrant negotiator.

Such a gloomy forecast is among others a case of simplification of an unclear narrative. We have frequently looked at the Pakistani and Afghani players as a monolith, with shared interests and common foes. The participants in this story are diverse and engaged in a fight with every other participant, including their supposed allies. Notably the Tehrik-i-Taliban and allies are opposed by the Punjabi governing elite, , national parties, the MQM and partly by the Balochs. Further the areas bordering Afghanistan wherein the Taliban and other extremist agencies are based have not been conclusively lost. Instead FATA, Quetta, Mohammed Agency are frontlines, with Pakistan being the prize.

Let us here for the moment assume Taliban’s victory over Afghanistan, with active Pakistani involvement. Is this really the nightmare situation for India, as has been painted in public discourse. In this author’s personal opinion, partition was the actual nightmare for Indian political and military strategists. All we are facing now are the after-shocks. It reflects negatively that we have yet to come up with a coherent public policy for dealing with results of said nightmare. Lack of communication of Indian foreign policy objectives to the public la the USA is a very significant lacuna on part of Indian administrators. This is so as it is the public which bears the cost for all policies.

In this article we will attempt to look at steps that India may take to turn around a Taliban takeover of af-pak region into a beneficial stand.

In our present context, it is interesting to note that the USA is looking at employing its time tested tactic of dividing a region it cannot hold. The Korean peninsula and Vietnam are prime examples of this approach. It is the US belief that short of an outright victory, a region clearly divided into blue and red is the most effective tactic in stopping a domino effect for the whole region. Vietnam being an example where after US withdrawal, the whole region became communist. A partition of Afghanistan will be of dubious benefit to USA and allies, as it will require continued expenditure of men and political will, to prop up and defend Northern Afghanistan. While this might be an easier task, with a friendlier population, the USA would be stuck in a semi-permanent deployment. From the Indian perspective this would be a very helpful development as;

1. The USA will continue to take an active interest in reducing Pakistani radical structures and manpower,
2. The focal point of Islamic extremism will continue to be divided between Kashmir and Afghanistan,
3. Northern Afghanistan will comprise of friendly elements of the Northern Alliance, which India shares a long standing relationship with.

Though this is a very brief summary of benefits, the logistics would allow India to establish a limited presence on the ground. The challenges for USA would be varied and would require renewed involvement with cold war era players, i.e. the CIS and Russia for setting up such a partition. The one nation which would be the clear beneficiary would be Iran, as it will gain prominence as a stabilising and influencing agent. The challenges for USA would however be gigantic and any partition may at best be a de-facto arrangement.

India needs to formulate a foreign policy doctrine for public consumption which takes into account the history of engagement with Pakistan and ways to deal with the threat of violence centred around the Af-Pak region. An attempt will be made to formulate an example of such a doctrine, later in this discussion.